Abstract
Introduction
The advent of mobile phones has brought about a lot of changes in the way we communicate and relate to each other. It has also come along with the readily availability of information. As at now, information can be assessed readily anytime-anywhere. The increasing dependence on anytime-anywhere availability of information and the commensurate increasing fear of losing privacy motivate the need for privacy-preserving techniques in mobile social networks.
Since the inception of social network concept, there have been a lot of improvements. On social networks, a lot of personal and private information are shared. Some of this personal and private information shared are not intended or meant to be available to everyone. As a result persons who should not be privy to this information happen to view and use them. It must be noted that even social networks that are completely open, there is a-disconnect between users willingness to share information and their reaction to unintended persons viewing or using this information [13] . The success of social networks has come along with some of its core and common uses; private matchmaking and finding the characteristics or attributes that are common to two or more persons.
Private matchmaking is interesting as it has conflicting requirements for anonymity and authentication. A private matchmaking protocol allows two or more mutually suspicious parties with matching credentials to locate and authenticate each other without revealing their credentials or identities to anyone including the matchmaker. Private matchmaking is more than mutual authentication of suspicious parties in that it has further requirements on privacy and efficiently locating. The goals and requirements of a private matchmaking protocol can be motivated by considering a job-referral service. Imagine that a company wants to hire a new vice-president from among one of the current vicepresidents of its competitors. The company does not want to announce the job opening and a person currently employed by a competitor does not want to announce his/her willingness to leave. Neither party wants to reveal information about their wishes unless they know that the other party has a matching wish [5] .
Also, there are instances when two parties would like to identify their common customers for a joint marketing exercise, without divulging any additional customers. In this scenario, they would like to ensure that (a) neither party learns more than their own data and must obtain the intersection (if one exists), while neither should learn anything about other set and (b) if one party learns the results of the match, both parties should learn it. Hence, the research community has foreseen the need for mechanisms to enable limited (privacy-preserving) sharing of sensitive information and a number of effective solutions have been proposed. Among them, Private Set Intersection (PSI) techniques are particularly appealing for scenarios where two parties wish to compute an intersection of their respective sets of items without revealing to each other any other information [1] .
In their paper, Sang and Shen [8] addressed the issue of privacy preserving set intersection (PPSI) problem, in which each of the N parties learns no elements other than the intersection of their N private datasets. They also proposed an efficient protocol in the malicious model, where the adversary may control arbitrary number of parties and execute the protocol for its own benefit.
Consider two organizations that wish to privately match their data. They want to find common data elements (or perform a join) over two databases without revealing private information. This was the premise of the papers in [3, 15, 20] . The main limitation in these protocols is that, it is asymmetric. Thus if we want both parties to learn the answer, we must trust Alice to send AB  to Bob. This asymmetry may be acceptable or even desirable in some scenarios, but may be undesirable in others. In the likely event of two dishonest persons in the protocol, the one receiving the intersection may not truly report the intersection or may even terminate the protocol after knowing the intersection. These scenarios lead to information asymmetry. As a result, the research community has proposed symmetric matchmaking protocols. In these protocols, the parties involved in the protocol obtain the intersection mutually [10, 12, 23, 36] .
Most often than not, the sharing of information involves two persons seeking to know if their private sets have any common information. Hence, two main challenges are encountered; (1) how to enable this type of sharing such that the parties learn no (or minimal) information beyond what they are entitled to and (2) how to do so efficiently in real world practical terms [2] . In both asymmetric and symmetric protocols, since each party is not willing to disclose the content of their list, ordinary private set intersection will not be appropriate to use in finding the intersection. In light of this, authorized private set intersection is more appropriate. The main contribution of this research is to formulate a novel hybrid proximity-based matchmaking protocol that is privacypreserving, efficient and secure against malicious attacks. In our proposed protocol, not only does the initiator find a matching-pair, but the pair that has at least the preset threshold number of common attributes. Furthermore, apart from the matched-pair that is privy to the number and type of their common attributes, no one else does.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: we take a brief look at private set intersection. In section II, we present related work. Our protocol and the algorithms for the matchmaking are presented in section III. In section IV, we take a look at the security of our algorithm. Finally, we conclude this paper in section V.
(AUTHORIZED) PRIVATE SET INTERSECTION, (A)PIS
Generally speaking, Private Set Intersection (PSI) is a cryptographic protocol that involves two players, say Alice and Bob, each with a private set. Their goal is to compute the intersection of their respective sets, such that minimal information is revealed in the process. In other words, Alice and Bob should learn the elements (if any) common to both sets and nothing else. This can be a mutual process where, ideally, neither party has any advantage over the other.
In In particular, we consider the scenario where two persons each hold a set of attributes and wish to find the intersection of their attributes without revealing other attributes that are not in the intersection. In such applications, it is important to ensure that each data item being exchanged is properly authenticated or authorized by a certification authority in the intersection protocol [4] . When authorization is done, it thwarts dishonest behavior. Unless some form of authentication is required, a malicious party can claim possession of fictitious data items, in an attempt to find out whether the other party possesses those data items.
The problem of authentication of mutually suspicious parties is one that is becoming more and more important with the proliferation of distributed systems. A user in a distributed system may not only need to verify the identity of the system, but may require that the system, or another user or node in the system, verifies itself to him/her. Moreover, both sides may require some degree of authentication before they release any information about themselves [7] . The usual solution to such problems (of wanting to know what you have in common without disclosing any other personal secrets) is to consult a trusted third party. However, this may not be practical in a highly distributed situation. For one thing, there may not be a central authority that all parties are willing to trust. On the other hand, such a central authority may exist, but may not be available to all users at all times. One solution to these problems lies in the development of cryptographic matchmaking protocols. That is, protocols in which users with various secrets can verify whether or not their secrets agree without revealing the secrets to each other or a third party.
The goal of certifying the private sets of participants is to restrict their inputs. This reduces the strength of a malicious participant. Bob though malicious will follow the protocol, but as he wishes to learn as much as possible about the private set of Alice, he can strategically populate his private set with all of his best guesses for Alice's private set and hence, his private set will be as large as possible. This maximizes the amount of information Bob learns about Alice's private set. In the extreme case, Bob may claim his private set contains all possible elements, which will always reveal the private set of Alice. He may also vary his set over multiple runs of the protocol, in order to learn more information over time. These attacks are even more powerful when the protocol can be executed anonymously. It must be noted that all these behaviors are permitted in any protocol which allows the participants to choose their inputs arbitrarily [19] .
Related Work
In this section we will take a look at some previous works on matchmaking for mobile social networking, and then focus on reviewing some cryptographic protocols for matchmaking.
Mobile Social Networking Applications
In private set intersection problem, two parties each have a set of elements. They compute the intersection of their sets such that no party learns any information other than the intersecting elements. Matchmaking protocol is a private set intersection problem where a matching-pair is made by computing the intersection of their individual attributes.
In matchmaking, most often than not, the introduction of a trusted central server is one of the techniques for addressing such issue. With this, the trusted central server is involved in each step of the matchmaking process. The trusted central server collects personal attributes and location information, computes the intersection and notifies the matched-pair. Such protocol applications can be found in [11, 21, 22] . In the applications such as [28, 29] , the websites can find nearby people with shared interests. They require a trusted server that participates in each matchmaking operation. The server knows the interests and current location of each user and performs matchmaking based on this information. This approach allows the server to track users. The use of a trusted central server has got some challenges. That is, it is unlikely that all the users are willing to send their personal information to the server. Also, the centralized server is generally based on connection to the internet, in some application scenarios, users would like to perform matchmaking through multiple communication channels (e.g. Bluetooth). Furthermore, one-point-failure and bottle-neck problems limit the systems' scalability. Also, mechanisms have to be put in place to provide security protection for the centralized server. On the other hand, as the number of users increases, the centralized server may become overloaded as a result, the quality of service may drop.
Another way is the fully distributed technique, which requires no trusted server in the whole matchmaking process, [9, 23, 35] . The operations, such as the distribution of personal attributes data, the computation of the intersection set, and the dissemination of results are performed among multi-parties, without any trusted third party. The attributes of the initiator and the candidates are shared among multi-parties using Shamir Secret Sharing Scheme, the computing of common attributes set are conducted among multiparties as well [21] . In an application like MobiClique [6] , users' smartphones broadcast beacons to nearby devices by using Bluetooth to show their owners information. This approach reveals personal private information to anyone within reach of the Bluetooth.
The third technique in use is a hybrid, where a trusted centralized server is needed only for the purpose of management and verification, and it does not participate in the matchmaking operations. This mechanism can provide efficient matchmaking services with relatively high scalability. In [12, 17, 19, 26, 36] , are the protocols based on hybrid mechanisms designed to support privacy preserving attributes matchmaking functions for MSN.
In [15] , with two persons involved in matchmaking, at the end of the protocol only one of them, say Alice, computes the intersection set. Thus, this protocol may lead to information asymmetry. Alice may decide not to report the intersection set truly to the other user. Also, Alice may decide not to continue with the matchmaking after knowing the attributes of the other user. Furthermore as the proposed protocol is one way, several malicious attacks can be launched by the parties in the protocols. This protocol was improved upon in [12] by removing the likelihood of malicious attack by persons involved in the protocol. Also, both persons in the protocol perform the intersection set.
These fore-mentioned proposed protocols do not take into consideration if the wouldbe pair has enough common attributes to qualify to be paired. In [17] , there was an improvement in the matchmaking protocols by letting a user (called initiator) find the best match among multi-parties (called candidates). In this protocol, the best match means the user (among other candidates) that has the maximum intersection set size with the initiator. It can be noted that this protocol is not very adequate as the best match does not necessarily mean the pair has got enough common attributes to make a good pair.
Privacy-preserving scalar computation of ab was used in [36] to find the number of common attributes two persons have before they are match-paired. In this protocol, the TA has n number of attributes and each person in the protocol forms a binary vector of 
Private Matchmaking Protocols
In order to preserve privacy related problems of personal attributes in social networks, some researchers use protocols such as oblivious transfer (OT) [18, 24, 30] , identity-based encryption (IBE) [31] , searchable encryption [32] , privacy-preserving profiles searching (PPPS) [33] , access-right revocable scheme [34] , middleware for mobile social networking [6] , privacy-preserving matchmaking protocol [12] , and decentralizationbased scheme [23] .
Oblivious transfer (OT) is a protocol which allows a server to transfer one of two items to client, such that the client can choose which item s/he wants, keep his/her choice hidden from server, and learn nothing about the other item. OT can be used to construct private set intersection protocols [18, 24, 30] . These were improved upon by Kissner and Song [2] . Using threshold cryptosystem, they proposed efficient protocols to solve privacy preserving set intersection and privacy-preserving set matching problems. The former arises when each member in the protocol wants to learn the intersection of the private dataset. In the later, each party in the protocol wants to learn whether its elements can be matched in any private set of the other parties. In this proposed protocol, efficient computation of intersection, union, and element reduction of multiset operation is achieved by using polynomial representations and employing the mathematical properties of polynomials. Thus, private set intersection (PSI) protocols enable two parties each holding a set of input to jointly compute the intersection of their inputs without leaking any other information. However these are less efficient than specialized protocols, and efficiency decreases when elements are chosen from larger domains hence, cannot be used in a distributed environment. Variants of this protocol can be found in [1, 27] . In [7] , there was the use of Shamir Secret Sharing to guarantee the privacy of the intersection set and prevent malicious attacks.
Freedman, et al., [20] introduced the oblivious pseudorandom function based protocols, which implemented private set intersection and private cardinality of set intersection protocol based on pseudorandom function. Hazay and Lindell [24] used efficient secure protocols for set intersection and pattern matching, securely computed the set intersection functionality based on secure pseudorandom function evaluations, in contrast to previous protocols that are based on polynomials. In addition, utilizing specific properties of the Naor-Reingold pseudorandom function, a secure pseudorandom function evaluation in order to achieve secure pattern matching was achieved. In [25] , there is an improvement in oblivious pseudorandom function.
In [12] , when individuals want to query the common items in their database, they compute the hash values of their individual items. They then exchange the hash values of their individual items. In this way, they are able to find the common items in their intersection without revealing any other items that are not in the intersection. Other researchers use commutative encryption to achieve private set intersection and private cardinality of set intersection. Commutative encryption has the property
Thus, for two private keys 12 and kk , the same encryption will be achieved despite the order of encryption. The main idea of using commutative encryption as a keyed one-way hash function is to generate a mapping for each element
x , such that no member of the protocol knows the key. From the above commutative encryption property, either users cannot learn the other party's information outside the intersection because of the lack of the necessary key information. In Agrawal, et al., [15] , they suggested the power function, 
Our Protocol
Our proposed protocol will help match-pair seekers find the most appropriate pair in a mutual matchmaking protocol by first allowing them compute the number of attributes they have in common. If the number of common attributes is at least the minimum threshold set by the initiator, they then become a matching-pair. They then exchange their actual attributes they have in common. In order to ensure privacy in this proposed protocol, each person can only know the intersection (if it exits) and his/her input to the matching protocol. Aside from this information, no other information is available to either person. Nonspoofability of the other users' attributes is another characteristic of our protocol. In this protocol, some privacy levels needs to be considered; Privacy level 1: When algorithm 1 ends the initiator, Alice and each of the other persons in the protocol mutually learn the size of their intersection set. An adversary should learn nothing.
Privacy level 2: At the end of algorithm 2, Alice and the matched-pair(s) in the protocol mutually learn the intersection set (their common attributes) between them. An adversary should learn nothing.
In our protocol, we do not consider the following threats and make the following assumptions:
1) Users keep their private keys safe, so that malicious users cannot steal their private keys to impersonate them or compute their personal attributes;
2) The CA cannot be compromised by attackers; 3) Users trust the person with whom our protocol finds and that the matched-pair will not disclose his/her attribute to others.
The initiator, Alice sets a threshold number of common attributes,
Threshold
A that an individual(s) should possess to qualify as a match-pair. This is because Alice wants a matching-pair(s) that has at least a certain number of common attributes. In our protocol, in order to prevent malicious persons from manipulating the input set, their private inputs are certified by a certification authority, CA.
Initial Phase
Our system consists of T users (persons) denoted as 1 Note that, we assume that the system adopts some standard way to describe every attribute, so that two attributes are exactly the same if they are the same semantically.
As depicted in algorithm 1, the CA generates an RSA key pair, 
H b N  
This process is done just once for each member in the protocol. In the event that an individual wants to update the interests, s/he goes through the same process again. But before a new certificate is issued, the CA checks if there are any complaints about the individual. In the event that there are complaints against the individual, the CA refuses to renew the certificate.
Matchmaking Phase
Alice has private input For simplicity, let us assume Bob was the only individual in the protocol that has the number of attributes that is at least .
Threshold

A
In order to know the actual attributes Alice and Bob have in common, they have to exchange their random numbers in algorithm 2. Alice and Bob undertake authenticated Diffie-Hellman protocol [14] to exchange their private keys (the random odd numbers in algorithm 1). After this exchange, secure communication can be undertaken.
Algorithms
In algorithm 1, Alice is able to find an individual(s) who has at least the threshold number of common attributes with her. A R At this point, they will be able to compute to know the actual attributes they have in common.
Security
The private sets of Alice and the individual(s) are certified by the CA. As a result, only certified set of attributes are used in the protocol. The certification of attributes by the CA in this protocol prevents a malicious person from cheating by changing his/her input attributes and to ensure that the attributes used in the protocol by Alice and the individuals, they really possess them. respectively. This computation is to certify the input attributes of the persons in the protocol. By this, the attributes of Alice and the other individual(s) in the protocol are bound to them. Hence, they cannot change or modify their attributes so as to gain more information from the others. This facilitates the security of this protocol as individual(s) cannot input attributes they do not possess. Alice and the other individual(s) in each step in the algorithm ensure that the other cannot know the actual attributes they possess before the protocol ends. An individual may terminate the protocol before it ends if s/he is able to know the other person's personal attributes. After Bob has been found as having at least the threshold number of attributes in algorithm 1, algorithm 2 ensures that Alice and Bob exchange their random odd numbers so as to compute their common attributes. To ensure that their random odd numbers are exchanged safely, Alice and Bob undertake authenticated DiffieHellman protocol in algorithm 2. Apart from the intersection set, nothing else will be learnt from the protocol. Also, this proposed protocol guards against spoofing. Thus, the attributes of the persons in the protocol are authorized. Hence, a dataset containing a user's attributes can be queried by another user if the owner of the specific queried dataset authorizes the user. In other words, a user cannot generate a query without authorization from the dataset owner. In this protocol, we cannot absolutely prevent user profiling as the initiator and its best matching-pair will mutually learn their intersection set. Thus, our protocol seeks to minimize the amount of private information revealed in one protocol run. Our protocol is also collusion resistant as members cannot collude to know the attributes of Alice. The persons in the protocol cannot collude to know the attributes of Alice as they do not know the existence of the other persons in the protocol.
At the end of the protocol, Alice outputs, 

The outputs of both Alice and each individual are same hence, the protocol is correct.
Achievement of Privacy Levels
Privacy level 1 is achieved in steps 7 and 8 of algorithm 1. In step 7, Alice computes and outputs Privacy level 2 is achieved after completing algorithm 2. When they complete algorithm 2, each will know the random odd number of the other. With the knowledge of these random odd numbers, Alice and Bob will know the actual attributes they have in common with each other.
CONCLUSION
With the increasing popularity of mobile social networks, it is important to develop secure and privacy preserving protocols to enable users to effectively interact with each other. In our protocol, an individual can find the best match-pair from among many potential individuals by setting a threshold number of attributes that another individual should possess in order to qualify as a pair. This is executed without any other individual knowing any information about the matched-pair. Our protocol for matchmaking preserves users' information from unnecessary leakage of private and personal information.
